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Abstract 
This article investigates the cognitive limitations on policy change in counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts 
by examining why American decision-makers failed to revise their government strategy substantially 
while fighting the insurgency in Afghanistan in 2003-2014 and why their British counterparts were more 
successful in adjusting their policies in the Malayan insurgency in 1948-1954. Unlike most of the 
counterinsurgency (COIN) literature that concentrates on military strategy and tactics, the analysis of 
government policy-making in Malaya holds some important political lessons for American leaders today 
despite differences between the insurgencies in Afghanistan and British Malaya. As a response to the 
criticism of COIN studies in general that they lack theoretical guidance, this article utilizes an integrated 
cognitivist-prospect theory framework. It is argued that some of the COIN literature mistakenly suggests 
that a more difficult strategic situation was primarily responsible for American failure in Afghanistan. 
Instead, American decision-makers faced a more difficult task cognitively than their British counterparts, 
as policy change in Afghanistan would have required greater ideational change. American principals were 
much more attached to their beliefs emotionally, had no alternative problem representation, and had to 
shift between frames in order to engineer a response that was more in line with events on the ground in 
Afghanistan. Regarding prospect theory, findings indicate that gains frames appear to be unhelpful in 
monitoring progress until catastrophic failure endangers the reference point, and that decision-makers 
often have more than one reference point to attune their policies to, which often results in suboptimal 
choices with regard to at least one reference point. 
 
Key words: counterinsurgency, foreign policy change, Malaya, Afghanistan, United States, United 
Kingdom 
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1. Introduction 
The United States entered Afghanistan in 2001 under the presumption that American presence 
would be short-lived, an alternative government was available, and no major US force build-up was 
necessary. Although Taliban activity was on the increase after 2003, it took three to five years until the 
Bush Administration acknowledged the failure of its initial policy choices. US inaction in Afghanistan is 
often explained by the fact that the Bush Administration gave priority to Iraq, which reduced both the 
attention and the willingness to deal with Afghanistan sooner.1 Yet, this is hardly a complete explanation 
of the policies regarding Afghanistan. It certainly cannot account for the limited effort the Obama 
Administration undertook, which resulted in some tactical gains but still leaves the future of Afghanistan 
uncertain as after the withdrawal of US combat troops.2 Thus, this article asks why and how governments 
recognize—or not—foreign policy failure and change their policies. It contends that the rigidity or 
flexibility of policies is cognitively motivated to a great extent and, thus, is rooted in the beliefs that 
decision-makers hold at the beginning of such conflicts.  
This article uses a comparative approach, contrasting America’s Afghanistan policy from the 
outbreak of the insurgency in 2003 until 2014 with British policy against Communist insurgents in 
Malaya between 1948 and 1954. Malaya has become a standard point of reference in most 
counterinsurgency (COIN) studies.3 However, the COIN literature overwhelmingly focuses on strategy 
and tactics4 – an approach whose applicability to Afghanistan COIN experts have rightfully questioned. 
COIN doctrine is a set off broad principles whose particular adaptation is heavily context dependent. 5 At 
the same time, comparative and theory-driven analyses of the political processes are scarce. While 
transferring any lessons into a different country and era should be done with caution, 6 Malaya has 
important political lessons to offer for more recent COIN campaigns such as Afghanistan. British policy-
making in Malaya is particularly instructive, because it suggests that insurgents can be fought 
successfully even after initial policy failure if decision-makers re-examine and restructure their beliefs.7 
Furthermore, policy-making in London during the Malayan emergency is a useful analytical tool in 
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explicating the problems of America’s Afghan policy, as the two cases share important political dilemmas 
as well as contextual similarities. 
Similarly to Afghanistan, Malaya was a protracted first conflict over opposing ways of life 
following foreign policy restructuring. Other similarities include pre-conflict support to the present enemy, 
severe constraints due to military commitment and lack of resources elsewhere in the world, a multi-
national campaign, the eruption of an insurgency after shortly (re-)establishing control over the territory, 
and constraints of another foreign policy event (the recognition of Red China in 19508 vs. relations with 
Pakistan). In addition, once the insurgency occurred, the two states also faced much the same challenges: 
fighting an insurgency that was partly the result of their own mistaken policies, preparing the territory for 
independent governance during which consent had to be won for the presence of non-local forces, and 
creating legitimate local capacity had to be created. 
Admittedly, the Bush Administration may have faced a more difficult task on the ground than the 
Attlee government did more than fifty years earlier.9 Yet, to contend, as Gentile’s popular reinterpretation 
of the Malayan emergency does,10 that the British could have hardly failed in Malaya is an argument 
based on hindsight that does not reflect the alarm that spread through Whitehall in the early phase of the 
Malayan effort. Even if such alarm was overreaction,11 which is a seriously questionable proposition, 
government perception is as important as reality for cognitively motivated studies such as this article.  
A combined framework of cognitive psychology and prospect theory is applied here to foster 
heretofore sparse theoretical thinking about COIN campaigns. The more thorough reflection that theories 
can offer about conditions that foster and hinder the eruption and successful combating of insurgencies is 
important inasmuch as insurgencies are likely to remain a permanent feature of international politics.12 On 
the theoretical level, this article adapts prospect theory to the analysis of foreign policy change, which has 
received only sporadic attention so far. 
Several background assumptions are in order. First, this article presumes that political decisions 
are important drivers for policy change, defining military missions and fighting insurgencies 
successfully.13 Consequently, the focus is on the political – and not the strategic – aspects of the cases. 
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Second, it is assumed that states are not unitary actors: minority opinions and contrasting perspectives 
exist in government, and domestic politics play a role in international relations. Finally, it is assumed that 
in places where an insurgency is brewing, counterterrorism is not a sufficient policy option: it disregards 
the importance of the civilian population in beating insurgencies.14 Instead, a counterinsurgency strategy 
needs to be executed.15 
In discussing how and why governments recognize policy failures, two facets of the policy-
making process will be analysed: (1) the governments’ role in the eruption of the insurgencies and their 
initial responses to them and (2) the process by which policy failure was recognized and how it led to 
policy change. The analysis relies on government documents, memoirs, and historical and political 
accounts. While quality sources are in abundance regarding Malaya, accounts with respect to Afghanistan 
are, unfortunately, more sporadic, self-justificatory and biased. 
This article finds that British policy was more susceptible to change because a smaller degree of 
emotional attachment to ideas and the possibility of simply reordering existing schemas meant less 
strenuous cognitive barriers for decision-makers to overcome. The British government’s task was also 
easier at the cognitive level in that its world view suggested a clear reference point for Malaya, and it 
could operate within the same (loss) frame throughout the examined period (1948-1951). In case of 
Afghanistan, a shift in both world view and framing would have been necessary. While the US 
government found a reference point – albeit belatedly – and changed its framing and, partially, its belief 
system, it never came to reflect on its goals and core beliefs the way in which the British did. This article 
suggests that the gains frame can create additional cognitive barriers and is not helpful in finding a well-
defined reference point or adequately monitoring progress. 
Additionally, the analysis of the Attlee cabinet and the Bush and Obama Administrations shows 
that decision-makers operate with a complex set of beliefs, some of which are more closely tied to the 
actual situation than others. As a result, decision-makers may have to juggle multiple reference points, as 
demonstrated by the confounding effect of Iraq between 2006 and 2008 and, more emphatically, that of 
domestic politics during the Obama Administration. In both cases, the two reference points suggested 
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different and conflicting preference ordering as well as different time frames. In such cases, choices are 
likely to be suboptimal with regard to one reference point (see Bush and Iraq) or both of them. President 
Obama postponed, but did not prevent, foreign policy losses and minimalized, but did not nullify, 
prospective domestic losses in popularity. All in all, having more than one reference point and multiple 
time-horizons opens up exciting, if infinitely complex, analytical opportunities for prospect theory. 
 
2. Counterinsurgency, Foreign Policy Change and Cognitivism 
2.1. Counterinsurgency 
Due to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, counterinsurgency studies have flourished of late. Yet, they 
are primarily concerned with the tactical – or at best, the strategic – level.16 It is now popular to correct 
misconceptions about COIN being a distinct kind of warfare,17 the role of ‘saviour’ generals,18 or the 
importance of winning “hearts and minds” in COIN campaigns.19 Moreover, it is common to question the 
viability of COIN as a tool of imperial policing, as well as its moral desirability, 20 which, though 
important in debating US grand strategy, bears little scientific relevance.21 
Several authors, including Gentile, note that the immense focus on the operational level means 
overlooking the “causes, ideologies, and motives” of interventions.22 Yet, the relevant political decisions, 
which would help in understanding such factors, are rarely examined in the COIN literature. Only some 
historically-oriented or politically-motivated accounts of developments in Malaya and Afghanistan deal 
with the effects of decisions made in London and Washington, respectively, mostly in the form of single 
case studies.23 However, the sanctioning of COIN operations at the political level is important, or else 
armies are left to fight with very serious restrictions.24 Thus, any conclusions about the success and 
viability of COIN operations may be misleading without also examining relevant political decisions. 
Finally, few COIN studies use theoretical insights to guide their analysis, and no theoretically 
based study of causes, ideologies and motivations has been conducted to date. When used, theories – 
psychological or other – are applied in an ad hoc manner. 25 Two rare exceptions are Payne and Gompert, 
whose respective studies discuss the tactical insights that social psychology and cognitive psychology 
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have to offer.26 Finally, Duncanson and Cornish employ feminist discourse analysis to illuminate the 
gendered nature of solders’ and journalists’ thinking about COIN. 27  However, again, these studies 
concentrate on the tactical—not the political—level. 
 
2.2. Prospect Theory 
Prospect theory addresses decision-making under risk. It divides the decision-making process into 
two stages.28 Before decision-makers evaluate and select between alternatives, they first make sense of 
the situation, or frame it. In this framing phase, people do not define situations in absolute terms, but with 
regard to a specific reference point. Often the reference point is the status quo. Compared to this reference 
point, the situation falls into the domain of gains – an improvement in the situation – or the domain of 
losses, i.e. a deterioration of the situation relative to the reference point. Gains and losses have different 
psychological effects. People value avoiding losses more than achieving gains. Consequently, they will 
take larger risks and make a bigger effort to avoid or redress losses, while they will behave more 
cautiously in the domain of gains. Following from people’s preoccupation with losses, once a risky option 
has been selected, decision-makers are likely to stick to it longer than to options selected as a result of a 
gains frame. However, high-probability outcomes behave differently, as they are tended to be viewed as 
certainties. The consequence is that the relationship between the decision domain and the risk-taking 
behaviour is reversed: ‘certain’ gains encourage risk-taking while ‘certain’ losses foster risk-aversion.29  
We know relatively little about how framing happens and how options are defined.30 So far only 
emotive factors, historical analogies, and “norms, habits, and expectations” are known to relate to 
framing.31 Prospect theory is a theory of individual choice. However, it can also be applied to groups of 
decision-makers,32 which allows it to take complex realities, including disagreements among decision-
makers, into account.33 This gives a greater appreciation to the multiple competing schemas and beliefs 
present in a group setting, which can be possible sources of change. Finally, domestic politics have been 
incorporated into prospect theory analyses, showing that domestic insecurity and international losses 
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reinforce each other in encouraging risk-taking, and that domestic politics also lead to difficult political or 
strategic trade-offs internationally.34 
Although a few studies have analysed change with the help of prospect theory,35 only recently did 
prospect theory garner more theoretical attention in this respect.36 Several aspects of prospect theory 
make change possible. As people are sensitive to environmental change, contextual change may trigger 
changes in framing and preferences.37 Evaluation of policy in relation to a reference point over time also 
opens up the possibility of change. With the passage of time (lag time), the reference point is seen from a 
different perspective, which may lead to the re-evaluation of the situation and the redefinition of the 
reference point, frames, and policy. Getting closer to the reference point may lead to added gains and, 
thus, relaxation of policy, while failing to get closer to it may result in a heightened sense of loss and 
riskier choices. Leaders whose earlier decisions result in losses are particularly likely to try to recoup their 
losses.38  
 
2.3. Cognitive psychology and change 
Cognitive psychology studies how human information processing diverges from the requirements 
of rationality. It focuses on the role of prior beliefs and norms in our attempts to make sense of the world 
around us. Whether to fill gaps in our knowledge or process large amounts of information, we interpret 
new information on the basis of old information. We store large clusters of interrelated concepts (schemas 
and beliefs) in our minds, which we create on the basis of past experience and readily apply to new 
situations. When more than one schema fits a given situation, we use the schema that is easiest to recall, 
such as the schema that relates to a more recent experience or that is more salient for us for some other 
reason.39 
Schemas do not yield easily to change. First, changing them requires some – often conscious – 
understanding of their inadequacy, but they are most often used unconsciously and survive in the face of 
others pointing out their shortcomings. The second problem is human tolerance for discrepant facts.40 A 
problem recognized is often initially attributed to unforeseen developments or bad execution, and only 
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later may decision-makers consider rethinking the problem. Third, the framing of a situation is 
difficult to change unless another acceptable problem representation is available. 41  Fourth, 
depending on their generality, some beliefs are more difficult to change than others. Since world views 
and principled beliefs are more deeply rooted and affect our thinking profoundly, they change with more 
difficulty and less frequency than causal beliefs about cause-effect relationships. However, when they do 
change, they result in more sweeping changes.42  
How exactly schemas change is not entirely clear, but two possible mechanisms have been 
identified so far. Change may be the result of one shattering piece of information that dislodges prior 
beliefs. Alternatively, and this is a better depiction of what happened with regard to Malaya and 
Afghanistan, change can come about as a result of the accumulation of a great amount of information that 
does not fit prior beliefs.43 This may then result in a drastic change in the schema or lead to so many little 
changes that the original schema gives way to a new one over time.44 However, change may not require 
changing the schema: the reordering of existing beliefs is sometimes enough to produce a shift in policy.45 
The cognitive requirements for change by reordering are less cumbersome than by replacing one schema 
with another.  
Foreign policy change is also difficult.46 Similarly to belief change, foreign policy change is 
conceptualized by the degree of its comprehensiveness. Because of the cognitive framework applied here, 
this study concentrates on goal change, i.e. the shift of the original policy purpose or problem 
representation.47 Consequently, if not accompanied with policy change, variation in troop levels is of 
minor importance for this analysis. 
 
3. Initial Reaction to the Outbreak of Insurgencies 
3.1. Malaya 
The Communist insurgency took the British by surprise because of their mistaken 
conceptualization of Malayan affairs as a primarily colonial problem. British government policy for 
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Malaya was guided by a competition between two foreign policy schemas: its old world view, 
imperialism, and the new one, anti-Communism, which had been adopted as a policy by the government48 
but had not yet replaced imperialism in the minds of the decision-makers. This led decision-makers to 
underestimate the Communist insurgents, who had fought side by side with the British against the 
Japanese to regain control of Malaya during World War Two. They were still regarded as friends: London 
saw them wanting the same thing as the British in post-war Malaya.49 Threats had been expected from the 
potentially dissatisfied Malay community as a result of the constitution-making process for a would-be 
independent Malaya but not from the Chinese minority that was sympathetic to Communism.50  
The government was obviously aware of growing Communist atrocities prior to the outbreak of 
the insurgency, but prioritizing imperialism and seeing the Communists as former comrades resulted in 
the British discounting troubling information rather than adapting their beliefs. Decision-makers painted a 
rather bleak picture of Communist activities and were expecting more serious trouble.51 Nonetheless, they 
discounted alarming information as overreaction caused by the fixation of the colonial administration on 
Communists or as melodrama created by succinct reports.52 
When atrocities broke out, Britain immediately recognized the existence of a problem, but this 
did not lead to a re-examination of prior beliefs. Principals used the same colonialism-dominated world 
view to frame the situation and prescribe a solution. Colonialism cast events in a framework of 
considerable loss. Though perceived as strategically unimportant, Malaya was a dollar-earning colony 
whose income was economically vital for a fragile British economy. 53  Most importantly, Malaya’s 
importance was framed in terms of Britain’s national identity as a colonial power. Britain felt a moral duty 
to lead its colonies to independence and transfer independence when colonial peoples were judged ready 
for it.54  
Anti-Communism remained important for the Attlee government only insofar as it upset colonial 
policy.55 A Communist Malaya was unacceptable, because the British would also have lost the initiative 
of granting independence on their own terms, failing to carry out their obligations to Malaya.56 Even if 
less important for principals’ thinking, anti-Communism counselled for a similar appreciation of the 
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situation as colonialism. The government found that expected losses were further magnified 
internationally because Britain’s reputation was also at stake: Malaya was the only place where Britain 
bore primary responsibility for fighting Communism and it enjoyed priority over all other global 
commitments.57  
Unlike the United States’ views with regard to Afghanistan, initial British appraisal of the 
situation helped to unequivocally define—i.e. to reaffirm—the reference point for Malaya. As before, the 
reference point was set in the future. With the passage of time the situation in Malaya was to be measured 
with regard to attaining the previously accepted objective of being able to grant Malaya independence, 
under a system of government that the British found best for Malaya, rather than succumb to the 
Communists’ terms and demand for independence. 
Viewing policies for Malaya in terms of imperial policy-making prescribed a legal-political 
solution with a minor military component to reinforce the police. 58 Despite different ideational roots, 
initial policy reactions bore similarities to American counterterrorism, 59 as they placed the problem 
outside mainstream Malayan politics and failed to notice the (Chinese) population’s role in strengthening 
the insurgents. The aim was to maintain regular political life in Malaya.  
In line with loss frames that counsel for risk-taking, the Attlee government perceived such a 
choice as very risky. Strategically, the troop increase left Britain without reserves for a year and, thus, 
unable to react to any additional developments elsewhere.60 Internationally, the Cabinet feared being 
denounced as ruthless imperialists who found a convenient excuse to desist from their commitment to 
Malaya’s independence.61 Domestic risk assessment only reinforced such views. The chosen policy had 
the potential to wreck the remnants of Labour’s unity because of the rank-and-file’s great sympathy for 
leftist movements.62 Furthermore, the government—mistakenly—anticipated public uproar at home at the 
prohibition of the Malayan Communist Party.63  
Unfortunately, imperialism and a legalistic attitude that flowed therefrom led to the 
misconceptualization of the situation in two ways. First, there was no balance or consistency between 
political and military components of their campaign. While good governance and a political approach are 
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foundations of effective counterinsurgency,64 the British took this approach to the extreme, leaving little 
space for military strategy and creating an illusion of normalcy. As a result, one ad hoc solution followed 
another, and troops were engaged in an inefficient manner and subordinated to a badly reputed police.65 
The strategy that emerged on the ground resembled American counterterrorism in Afghanistan in that it 
focused on removing terrorists.66 
Second, because the situation was viewed as a matter of colonial administration and policing in 
which Britain had considerable experience, the chances of success of the chosen policy were judged in 
unwarrantedly optimistic terms regarding both the length and ease of the effort. The situation was 
confidently described in government circles as a small guerrilla problem that would be easily solved in a 
few months.67 In contrast with this, a world view dominated by anti-Communism would have prescribed 
different conclusions, since principals would have already realized that fighting Communism was a 
serious long-term problem with few things to be sanguine about.68 The corresponding policy prescription 
should have also been more sober, forceful and perhaps of larger magnitude. 
 
3.2. Afghanistan 
The Bush Administration failed to prevent, and then acknowledge, the outbreak of the insurgency 
because its emerging new policy – the War on Terror (WOT) –, its prior beliefs about nation-building, and 
the lessons of Soviet and British fiascos recommended extreme caution in Afghanistan. First, although the 
WOT was borne out of a loss frame (i.e. as a reaction to lives lost and an embodiment of America’s 
subjective loss of security and invulnerability after 9/11),69 it cast policies for Afghanistan in a gains 
frame. Enemy-centric counterterrorism had nothing to gain from deeper involvement in Afghan politics as 
long as America could hunt down terrorists.70 
The governments’ causal beliefs regarding the lessons of the Soviet and British failures in 
Afghanistan and nation-building reinforced cautiousness that the gains frame suggested regarding large-
scale US presence in Afghanistan. It did so by casting substantial long-term American involvement in 
Afghan politics into the domain of certain losses. Decision-makers interpreted the past experience of great 
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powers in a way that the massive commitment of ground troops and long-term engagement were recipes 
for certain loss, vis-à-vis both the status quo and the future.71 Thus, certain loss as well as a gains frame 
counselled for caution, judging anything to be done for the local population too expensive and too risky. 
Consequently, unlike the British who worked from a loss frame, US principals considered the risk of 
sending a large number of troops to provide security, which would erode America’s ability to act 
elsewhere, prohibitively high.72 
The Administration’s view on nation-building supported, or perhaps even predetermined, such an 
interpretation. The President and some of his subordinates came into power on the premise that the United 
States should do no nation-building. 73  While the destruction of the twin towers gave the Bush 
Administration the leverage to overturn any previous policies,74 the belief in the “no nation-building” 
thesis proved too strong to be discarded despite the realization that the logical next step in Afghanistan 
was nation-building, and on a large scale. 75  Finally, domestic politics further strengthened the 
Administration’s visceral objection to nation-building, because nation-building was feared to threaten 
support for the WOT at home.76 
Consequently, the US misjudged its own importance for the future of Afghanistan – the Secretary 
of State’s objections in 2002 notwithstanding77 –, denying a leading role in reconstructions efforts and 
allowing Afghanistan to quickly fall off the top of the policy agenda.78 At the same time, the appraisal of 
the situation led the US to miscalculate the ability of its allies and the private sector to do nation-building 
on their own as much of the job was leased out to allies and private companies.79  
Worse, while there was a reference point associated with the WOT (i.e. the ability to hunt down 
terrorists), the Bush Administration had no clearly defined and measurable reference point or goals80 for 
Afghanistan itself, which would take until 2005 to work out. This made the government misplace its 
concerns and optimism, worrying too much about the war effort and too little about post-war 
developments.81  
In the absence of a reference point, the US lacked precise benchmarks for progress, and thus the 
growing insurgency could only raise modest concern. The government was aware of the insurgency from 
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2003 (even if its existence was denied publicly),82 but not before the Taliban was already operating an 
alternative government in Kandahar province (2006) would American decision-makers finally grasp the 
seriousness of the threat. In the meantime, modest concern led to no major re-examination of beliefs held 
and only a short-term course correction was effected, as part of which the Bush Administration slid into 
increased reconstruction efforts despite its continuing objection to nation-building. Lacking an overall 
plan to fight the insurgency, a light-footprint counterinsurgency strategy, in itself a contradiction in terms, 
was worked out locally. However, and somewhat reminiscent of consequences in Malaya, a lack of 
coordination and overlapping projects resulted in only modest results.83 Worse, troop withdrawal, transfer 
of power to NATO, and decreasing funding signalled disinterest again as well as a return to an enemy-
centric approach in 2005—exactly when the insurgents’ efforts multiplied.84  
Working out a goal for Afghanistan on the basis of the WOT or discarding deeply held beliefs 
about nation-building could have helped in recognizing the necessity of larger troop presence in 
Afghanistan, but were cognitively too strenuous to achieve. If the government had adopted at least a 
different interpretation of the Soviet and British fiascos, it could have broken down, or at least softened, 
cognitive barriers, leading to greater – if unenthusiastic – US participation in reconstruction, and thus the 
possible prevention of the insurgency and/or more powerful response to it. Indeed, at least two alternative 
interpretations of the Soviet and British fiascos were available: (1) it was not so much the number of 
troops that mattered but what they did,85 and (2) no power vacuum should have been left to make it easy 
for the Taliban or others to contest for power.86 
 
4. Policy Failure and Change 
4.1. Malaya 
Even though at the beginning the British government based its policies on faulty premises, 
several things would help it toward recognizing the failure of its policies and thinking: (1) the government 
defined a clear reference point, which contributed to the efficient assessment of developments in the 
future; (2) this reference point judged Malaya important for Britain; (3) an alternative world view, or 
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problem representation, was already at the disposal of the decision-makers; and (4) the government did 
not have to abandon its loss frame, which made it particularly sensitive to negative developments. Thus, 
the cognitive requirements for recognizing failure were much more modest than those American decision-
makers would face with regard to Afghanistan. 
The British government grasped its unconscious self-deception gradually, as evidence of it 
accumulated. There were only two components of its schema that had to be discarded – short-termism and 
optimism –, a relatively easy task given that neither were strongly held beliefs or crucial components of 
the government’s world view. Nonetheless, it took two years for it to acknowledge failure. First, in 
September 1948, still sanguine about the prospects, the Colonial Secretary described progress as slow, but 
steady.87 By mid-1949, decision-makers started to understand that they were not facing a brief effort.88 
Finally, in February 1950, the British government accepted that the anti-Communist campaign would be a 
lengthy one.89  
The constant monitoring of the situation in light of the reference point also made the government 
reassess its views about the success of its policies. The first crack in the cabinet’s sanguine approach 
appeared in March 1949 when, in a letter to the Prime Minister, Secretary of State for War Emanuel 
Shinwell asserted that the facts—an increasing number of atrocities and casualties—did not support the 
optimistic atmosphere about improvements in Malaya.90 However, not until Shinwell repeated his policy 
assessment a year later, this time calling the situation “grave,” did the government finally share his 
assessment.91 When it did, however, it also realized that it based its policy on the wrong schema. They 
understood that they were victims of  
 
“a certain tactical distortion (…) because of the way we formulated our task as the clearing up of 
gangs of bandits. This may have led to the concentration on jungle patrols, etc. which inevitably 
pay comparatively small dividends for the effort involved (…) The task is to break the power of 
the MCP.”92 
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In other words, the task was not only to uphold good governance, but to fight Communism and (also) 
provide adequate security by confronting rather than ignoring the Communists. Thus, the government did 
not have to discard its deeply held identity rooted in imperialism. It was enough to reorder its schemas 
and bring anti-Communism into the foreground while relegating imperialism to a secondary role.  
The policy review that the Prime Minister ordered in the wake of Shinwell’s second letter 
corroborated Shinwell’s views, pushing the Cabinet deeper into the loss frame. 93  As a result, the 
government committed itself to additional risks by moving toward a full-scale counterinsurgency strategy 
with a heavier military component and a more population-centred approach. It also continued to monitor 
the situation, which took a turn for the worse before starting to improve. The outgoing government was 
aware of these problems, but was at a loss as to what else could be done.94  
After entering office, the Churchill government, which was more ideologically wedded to 
imperialism and anti-Communism, reaffirmed the Attlee government’s understanding of the situation and 
attendant policies, including long-term commitment. 95  Long-term commitment helped the Churchill 
government to interpret domestic and international risk factors – military overstretch and the durability of 
public willingness to support the military effort in Malaya – and led to a redoubling of efforts. Thus, 
similarly to President Obama, the Churchill Cabinet was resolved to bring the military campaign to an 
end as soon as possible, but, in contrast with the Obama Administration, they wanted to do so only after 
attaining London’s original reference point and without putting a deadline on continuing efforts.96 
 
4.2. Afghanistan 
The cognitive breakthrough that characterized British policy-making did not occur in the United 
States. It is important to emphasize that it was not ignorance that prevented decision-makers from 
changing their goals. For example, Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld was clearly aware of what good 
policy-making required, as well as the need to address facts and assumptions and have a firm reference 
point.97 Rather, the inability to affect major changes was, to a great extent, due to decision-makers’ pre-
existing schemas98 and to significantly more strenuous cognitive requirements than in the British case. To 
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find a solution for Afghanistan, principals would have had to (1) modify their framing, (2) abandon or 
heavily adapt their counterterrorism schema, (3) discard their deeply held views about nation-building and 
(4) change their interpretation of the lessons of Soviet failure in the absence of alternative or competing 
schema. In the end, decision-makers were able to abandon the gains frame, their early optimism, and 
short-termism. However, principals tolerated a high level of cognitive dissonance throughout the process, 
and were only able to discard their views on nation-building outside the Afghan context, that is, in 
relation to Iraq.99  
To be able to monitor progress and, thus, recognize failure, American decision-makers first had to 
clarify their reference point, which happened gradually, and not until the summer of 2003 when the 
insurgency had already started.100 The October 16, 2001 Afghan strategy still rejected any long-term US 
role in post-war Afghanistan besides economic aid.101 Nonetheless, the concern in the Department of 
Defence (DOD) for strategy and measures of success demonstrated an active search for a quantifiable 
reference point. The first step in this direction was made in December 2001, when failure was defined as 
Afghanistan turning bad by spring 2002 and the warlords – but not the Taliban/Al Qaeda – engaging in a 
civil war.102 A clear reference point would emerge in July 2003 when lack of success, including renewed 
civil war, was defined in relation to the WOT and as undermining counterterrorism efforts in 
Afghanistan.103 The Bush Administration reached for a very general foreign policy schema (i.e. America’s 
self-identity as a pursuer of democracy around the globe), deciding that a moderate and democratic 
Afghanistan with a government capable of controlling and governing its territory, implementing plans for 
economic development, and contributing to the WOT was desirable. With this Washington, unlike the 
British whose aim for Malaya was to have good government, but not democracy, 104  settled on an 
impossibly broad end-state,105 which made detailed planning difficult.106 
After finding their reference point, US principals still took a year longer to identify policy failure 
as their British counterparts had. First, the new-found reference point played an important role in starting 
to erode principals’ undue optimism and their belief in short-termism, leading to a great deal of 
inconsistency in government appreciation of the situation in the next two years. In the course of 2003-
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2004 both Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Rice acknowledged that Afghanistan 
would be a “long hard slog,” and that “it was going to be a long struggle,”107 but early exit was still 
sought until 2005.108 Despite early worries in DOD and the recognition of the enormity of the task by 
Rice in 2004,109 the Afghan project was generally thought to be in good shape until 2005.110 
Accumulating unfavourable evidence, as well as the shock of the devastating attack on Navy 
SEALs – the first significant encounter of US troops with insurgents, resulting in the death of 19 
American servicemen – started to cast major doubts on the prevailing understanding of the situation in 
2005.111 The transition from a gains frame to a loss frame was steady but still took an additional year. The 
recognition of failure of the government’s earlier course correction, “accelerated success” 112 and of police 
training in summer 2005113 were important steps in this direction. Marin Strmecki’s 2006 policy review 
and Ambassador Neumann’s October 2006 warning only confirmed decision-makers fears as they 
testified to a deteriorating security situation and increasingly powerful Taliban presence in Southern 
Afghanistan.114 By the end of 2006, Rumsfeld,115 the intelligence community, Rice,116 and President Bush 
all subscribed to a loss frame with the President insisting in the fall of 2006 that “we cannot lose 
Afghanistan,”117 where by then the US already accepted a long-term role.118  
Unfortunately for Afghanistan, the Bush Administration had to cope with two reference points in 
the WOT, and accepted a similar loss frame regarding the Iraqi project with a more urgent time 
horizon.119 Unable to sustain parallel military campaigns, reminiscent of British experience with troop 
shortages between 1948 and 1950,120 the US only effected an “adjustment” in Afghanistan, which in 
reality was more of the same without any reflection on beliefs.121 Yet, developments in Iraq also had a 
positive effect for Afghanistan, as it was able to break the cognitive barrier against further troop 
commitments abroad—a step for which the Afghan context was inadequate, because every time a policy 
recommendation had required large American military deployment to Afghanistan, an alternative route 
had been suggested. 122  It was no different even in late 2006 after a multi-year counterinsurgency 
campaign was proposed.123  
In 2007 and 2008, inaction pushed the Bush Administration further away from its reference point, 
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as policies regarding Afghanistan came to be perceived as catastrophic failure.124 By November 2008 the 
government’s most optimistic assessment was being in a stalemate. Worse, in 2008, not only a democratic 
Afghanistan, but the WOT, which was seen as vital for US national security, was perceived as being in 
danger. But (repeated) recommendations for classic counterinsurgency measures came too late,125 as the 
Bush Administration’s term of office expired. 
The Obama Administration showed continuity in the appraisal of the situation, as principals 
subscribed to the idea of a long-term security commitment126 and reaffirmed the Bush Administration’s 
solid loss frame. The United States was without a comprehensive strategy, Al Qaeda was as strong as ever 
and Afghanistan could once again become a staging base for global terrorism. Losses were considered as 
certain if the status quo prevailed, since current policies were judged to be a recipe for failure.127 To mend 
this discrepancy between certain or highly probable prospective losses and current policy, President 
Obama started with readjusting the reference point in spring 2009. He reaffirmed the importance of the 
WOT, that is, the ability of the United States to go after Al Qaeda in Afghanistan,128 and cut back on goals 
regarding the future of Afghanistan. Democracy as a goal was replaced with establishing good 
governance. Such an early clarification of the reference point also made the establishment of a regular 
review process and, with it, the monitoring of progress toward or away from the reference point 
possible.129 
Despite similarity in framing, curbing the goals for Afghanistan was only one way in which the 
changing of government was less favourable for action in Afghanistan than it had been in Malaya. 
President Obama had different beliefs and preferences than his predecessor, showing a much stronger 
concern for the lessons of Vietnam instead of the lessons of Soviet and British interventions, and for 
domestic politics, which he also believed to be less manipulable.130 Moving away from a state-centric 
view that had stood behind the retaliation against Afghanistan for the wrong-doing of a non-state actor 
was helpful in separating Al Qaeda from the Taliban and treating Afghanistan and Pakistan as a single 
problem.131 However, apart from Secretary of Defence Gates, no one consciously considered, but neither 
did they fully discard, the implications of the Soviet lesson. The concern with having another Vietnam 
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guided policies (e.g. put a time limit on the Afghan surge), but its applicability was little examined even 
though the President rejected the analogy publicly.132 
Concern with domestic politics created an additional reference point that pulled principals toward 
different preference ordering than the evaluation of international factors. Internationally, both before and 
after the modification of the reference point, the perception of impeding losses in light of the status quo 
remained unchanged, and counterterrorism was judged as inadequate to achieve the desired end-state. 
Only taking substantial additional risks by engaging in full-scale counterinsurgency with an integrated 
political-military campaign, rather than the uneven counterinsurgency policy then in practice, was seen as 
the only viable policy to defend vital interests. 133  However, full-scale COIN was not practicable 
domestically, because it was perceived to result in a sure loss of the President’s support base that would 
make his re-election impossible. Immediate withdrawal, which would have harmonized with the lessons 
of both Soviet intervention and the Vietnam War, could have helped the administration avoid loss of 
support at home, had it not been for the President’s campaign pledge of further resources to Afghanistan 
and for such policy hurting America’s vital interests by making the reference point, i.e. the pursuit of 
counterterrorism operations, unattainable in the short term.134  
In the end, the Obama Administration chose a compromise solution, that is, a COIN campaign 
limited in scale and time. However, this was a suboptimal choice in comparison with the domestic and 
international reference points, mitigating but not abolishing potential losses domestically and, in the short 
run, internationally. In reality it was a medium-term exit strategy that committed US combat troops and 
resources to Afghanistan for three to five more years, allowing only for non-combat support operations in 
the long term. 135  Unsurprisingly, such a choice did not move principals’ estimate of success in 
Afghanistan away from the region of high probability losses as lack of belief in the chosen policy option 
suggests.136 
 
5. Conclusion 
Comparing American policies in Afghanistan to British policies in Malaya utilizing an integrated 
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approach consisting of a blend of cognitivism and prospect theory illustrates the effect of grand policy 
and related beliefs on a government’s ability to act and even to question their own views. The combined 
imperialism–anti-Communism schema of the British prescribed the frame and reference point for Malaya, 
while the WOT did no such thing for Afghanistan, at least not until developments started to affect the 
success of the WOT and placed it into the domain of gains. Recognizing failure and discarding policies 
that did not work was more difficult for principals who were emotionally attached to their beliefs, as was 
the case with respect to the Bush Administration’s views on “no nation-building.” Only failure in Iraq 
could wreck such beliefs, because decision-makers were more emotionally wedded to the fate of Iraq than 
even to ideas concerning nation-building. 
All in all, the primary obstacle for American decision-makers was not the more difficult strategic 
environment in Afghanistan as compared with Malaya as Gentile contends, 137  but the much more 
strenuous cognitive requirements for choosing policies to successfully combat insurgents. American 
decision-makers had no alternative problem representations the way the British decision-makers had, and 
instead of simply reordering components of their schema, American principals had to make more 
substantial adjustments in their beliefs. They also took longer to find a reference point and had to shift 
from a gains to a loss frame, which made the decision-makers lose additional time. Both British and 
American decision-makers were only able to make some less strenuous adjustments, including their views 
on the length and ease of the efforts. This, and the facts that decision-makers in both countries were 
reluctant to re-examine their views held at the outbreak of the insurgencies and applied schemas that had 
already been disproven and were wholly inadequate, are sobering reminders of the resilience of the 
human mind to disconfirming information.  
Nonetheless, as the Malayan case demonstrates, change is not impossible. However, because of 
the serious cognitive limitations, such changes are likely to be of small scale. This makes it vital to define 
goals realistically and, most importantly, early on, for without a reference point monitoring progress is 
impossible. Furthermore, US policy-making in Afghanistan strongly questions that, even if the required 
cognitive changes had occurred, any modern government would have the freedom to engineer the 
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necessary sweeping changes after 6-7 years of involvement in a conflict.138 This further accentuates the 
importance of adequate framing at the beginning. Nonetheless, the early definition of a reference point 
will assist countries little if their future is not seen vital for a great power, because every time a trade-off 
is necessary, suboptimal options will be chosen for non-vital allies.  
Even if long-term conflict involvement makes sweeping changes difficult, US governments could 
work harder at increasing their room for manoeuvre by actively lobbying Congress for support139 and 
being less fixated on potential domestic losses. Alternatively, a more honest and less optimistic approach 
about foreseeable difficulties at the beginning would help to prepare the public for possible setbacks and 
casualties. This may also help principals to make a more balanced – and less doctrinal – initial appraisal 
of the situation. 
The case studies generally support the approach taken in this paper. The Attlee government’s 
policies reaffirm prospect theory’s claim that, in a loss framework, additional losses result in further risk-
taking. A closer integration of prospect theory and cognitive psychology appears to be a useful approach 
in analysing policy change, or lack thereof, because framing cannot replace a cognitively motivated 
analysis of political action, as it creates additional cognitive barriers.  
Yet, this hybrid approach works well until decision-makers face trade-offs when an additional 
reference point surfaces because either domestic politics or another international event pulls decision-
makers toward conflicting preference orderings in the two dimensions. Owing to limited material or 
political resources, such cases are likely to be common. This accentuates and extends Levy’s claim about 
the complexities of introducing domestic politics into the analysis of international politics via prospect 
theory.140 The multiple dimensions of foreign policy-making can result in similarly complex analytical 
situations. Furthermore, domestic insecurities do not necessarily encourage risk-taking, especially if the 
reference point is in the future. The Bush Administration’s trade-off between Iraq and Afghanistan 
suggests that prospect theory analysis may be complex enough even without thinking of domestic politics. 
Opening prospect theory up to the possibility of multiple reference points is an exciting theoretical 
consideration, but may prove analytically too complex. 
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The way in which the original framing of the situation constrains behaviour may not necessarily 
be in harmony with prospect theory: the American case in this article suggests that, under certain 
conditions, gains frames are as likely to result in a strong insistence on continuing existing policies as loss 
frames. Gains frames appear to be far more problematic than loss frames. As has been illustrated, the loss 
frame in Britain was accompanied with a reference point that allowed British decision-makers to monitor 
progress carefully. Potential gains, which are less important to people than avoiding losses, are much less 
helpful in monitoring success, because they are less likely to force or help decision-makers to clearly 
define their reference points. Coming up with a more precise future reference point later is only a 
marginal improvement because, as long as the reference point is not endangered, such a gains frame is 
unhelpful for monitoring progress and generates biases toward checking for gains. In other words, a gains 
frame tends to invite inaction until catastrophe is imminent. This is a problematic development, inasmuch 
as the panic and time pressure that may follow are hardly ideal conditions to re-examine beliefs or update 
policy, particularly in foreign and security policy.  
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